

Implementation of the DDR in Cote d'Ivoire: Lessons from past DDR programs

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ABSTRACT

Long hailed as “a haven of peace”, Cote d'Ivoire has been facing, since 19 September 2002, its worst political crisis ever since its independence in 1960, leading to the partition *de facto* of the country, the Northern half part held by the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) and the Southern part controlled by the government of Laurent Gbagbo, the president in office. After five years of political deadlock, the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire seems to be drawing to a definitive end with the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Plan. Still, DDR as a program has not always been successful everywhere it has been implemented. This research paper explores and appraises: 1. comparatively some cases considered to be successful (Sierra Leone) and other unsuccessful (Liberia); 2. points out the main reasons for discrepancies in their achievements; and 3. draws the lessons that should be learnt for Cote d'Ivoire, and for other post-conflict settings; and maybe lessen the high expectations placed in the DDR and view it as one of the various ways of dealing with a post conflict environment.

Keywords: Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, reintegration, Cote d'Ivoire, rebellion, political crisis.

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INTRODUCTION

Last year on account of my field research for my PhD, I had to travel through to the hinterland, the Northern part of Cote d'Ivoire, particularly in the region of Seguela, controlled by the Forces Nouvelles, the rebel group. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2002, indeed, very few exchanges has taken place between the North and the South, mainly because of various obstacles on the roads such as undue road tolls levied by both armies, loyal army and rebel alike, let alone the molestation everyone could be subject to. After I crossed the buffer zone kept by the Blue Helmet, separating the Southern part from the Northern, when you enter the rebel controlled part of the country, I could see how the infrastructures have suffered from the various attacks led by the loyal army. From the current state of the roads, the factories, the schools, and the health care facilities it was easily noticeable how many damages the war has done to that part of the country. As far as schools and health care facilities were concerned, there were no more personnel to run these health facilities, and for the schools they were in the care some volunteers whose knowledge level

was not beyond the secondary level. On my way to the hinterland though, I could also notice at every station border the presence of soldier-like individuals who at just the way they carry their rifle and their outfit, one can bet that they are not professional soldiers, but have been recruited for the rebellion. I could also see children dressed up in military, with a rifle in shoulder belt, and their eyes hid behind black glasses¹. It was at that very time that I really took stock of the reality of the crisis undermining the country. Still, since about six month with the Ouagadougou talks, a new consensus has been settled between the chief rebel and the president. Therefore, the odds are that the two parties have engaged on the path of a definitive solution of the crisis. Still, this pseudo-happy end cannot hide some crucial questions, which if not efficiently handled could be critical for a peaceful postwar society. What will be of the former

¹ According to Amnesty International, 2005- the estimate number of children involved in various conflicts in Africa are more than 100.000. Liberia alone used up to 21.000 in the course of his 13 civil war.

fighters once the conflict ends? How would they be integrated later in the society? These issues are of vital importance, for if these individuals who have been lured into the conflict happened not to meet decent living conditions as promised by the various warlords, there might be a big risk of relapse into further violence. The international community driven by the United Nations, being aware of this fact has decided, since the early stage of the conflict, to apply the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme to deal with the aftermath of the crisis².

The view that the DDR process is a viable way of resetting a peaceful environment in a war-torn community is not fortuitous. Some countries such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique, among others, have already experienced the programme, and in fact, the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire is far from being an isolated case; it shares indeed many aspects both in the way it occurred and how it is led on the ground by the main actors with the other conflicts the African continent has been going through since the 1990s. First, they are all internal driven civil conflicts taking place between different social groups supported by a bunch of military groups, sometimes uncontrolled militias created and supported by the so-called democratically elected and legitimate government. Second, these conflicts are generally based on political motives erupting from by the poor legitimacy supporting the parties in power, so another group estimating itself more legitimate attempts to overthrow the former in order to bring much democracy. Third, most of the conflicts are operated from outside forces, be the weapon and the financial support, which make it often time difficult to reach a real peace agreement. Fourth, they are all conflicts taking place over the control of the national resources, and fifth all of them are caused by political transition. No wonder that the general conception since the incipient out breaking of the crisis, the international community and many analysts strongly suggested the DDR to be implemented as soon as possible.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration is the process of disbanding the armed group and/or reducing their number and turning most of them to civil life. It consists specifically of a series of political, economic and social measures implemented with the aim of facilitating the civil life of the ex-fighters as well as the various victims of the conflict.

Many analysts view it as a necessary way to recover from war to peace (Bossire, 2006; Boshoff, 2005; Frey and Boshoff, 2005; Mehretheab, 1997), because it paves the way for major institutional and social reforms that have to take place in the after war era. Besides, it remains unique as far as social reconciliation is concerned. As such, it is a 'precondition for sustainable

human and economic development' (Mehretheab, 1997).

Yet, DDR has been drawing more and more criticism over the past years. Although the DDR has achieved positive results in some countries, there remains a few issues to raise about the effectiveness of the process itself. Of course, the programme as a whole plays a key role by setting the ground for reconciliation, but does it really addresses the core issues such as poverty alleviation, or by focusing the attention on the DDR itself (as the transitional period between cessation of hostilities between fighting parties and effective integration of ex-fighters) odds are greater that the whole social issue would be ignored. Massimo FUSATO aptly raises both sides of the process in the definition he gives of the DDR '...is a first step in the transition from war to peace. Demilitarization can be used in time of peace as well, to reduce the size of armed force and redistribute public spending. However, DDR is much more complicated in a post-conflict environment, when different fighting groups are divided by animosities and face a real security dilemma as they give up their weapons, when civil society structures have crumbled, and when the economy is stagnant'. Moreover, other major problems are seen as obstacles, sometime turn out to be dilemma (Torjesen, 2006) have marred most of the past DDR such as poor planning of the various, absence of will from the fighting actors, time, and the failure to include 'special' groups such as women combatant and their dependants as well as children (Mcintyre and Thokazani, 2003). What is worse is that if the DDR 'ineffective, incomplete or badly designed DDR programs have an obvious result of increasing the insecurity of the environment ..., in turn affecting such factors as the political capacity of a new regime...' (Bossire, 2006). Another Achilles heels of the DDR that is commonly pointed out is the lack of funds for the programme till its end. Sometimes, it appears that 'the state is unable or unwilling to harness domestic and international resources effectively for poverty reduction' (Torres and Anderson, 2004).

As pointed out above, the DDR could be a key factor to building domestic peace in a country emerging from civil conflict, but at the same time analysts warn of various pitfalls that might be counterproductive. Overall, the general aim of this paper is to take stock of the scattered initiatives launched during the various DDR and see how they could fit in a broader efficient perspective. Thus, specifically, the papers aim is to:

1. Compare cases where DDR is seen as a success and cases where it did not work as expected
2. Draw the lessons for both cases
3. Design a DDR for Cote d'Ivoire and prospective war-torn states.

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study as a graduate student report

² See the strong consensus on the necessity of DDR in the statement of the UN President of the Security Council on 'Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace building' (S/PRST/1999/34).

mainly dictated the methodology used. The impossibility to proceed by any field study compelled the use of only desk research methodology, especially from specialized articles and books by both freelance scholars and international institutions dealing with research issues on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration. Besides, being aware that the field of after war social and economic reintegration is wide, the reading has been extended to Peace building, Peace Enforcement and/or Peace Enhancing and Conflict Resolution.

Overview of a social strife

Short chronology of the Ivorian crisis

In the night of 18 through 19 September 2002, the peaceful night of Abidjan, the political capital of Cote d'Ivoire, was disturbed by heavy gunshots. First, it was reported that it was a mutiny involving former soldiers whose demobilization was impending, for the new president who took office in October 2000 vowed for a professional army. But later, it turned out that it was a coup d'Etat as the previous attacks were waged against the main headquarters of the army called *Camp de Gendarmerie d'Agban*. The home minister Doudou Boga was killed as well as the former General Robert Guei along with most of his family members. However, later on, it was to be learnt that more than an insurgency, it was a rebellion that had taken control of two of the major hinterland cities, Bouake and Korhogo. Three days later, an unsuccessful attempt by the loyalist troops to regain control of Bouake had forced the central government to enter in negotiation with the rebels.

A truce brokered by Senegalese Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio was signed by the insurgents on 17 October, and accepted by the government. The ceasefire is being monitored by French troops pending the deployment of a buffer force by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which will initially comprise 1,254 men from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The 17 October ceasefire paved the way for talks in Lome, Togo, between a governmental delegation and representatives of the insurgents. By this time the rebels, known as the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI), included civilians such as the MPCI's secretary-general Guillaume Soro, a former student leader.

The talks, brokered by ex-Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema as head of a contact group set up by ECOWAS to help resolve the Ivorian crisis, yielded a first accord on 31 October. The two sides agreed to respect the ceasefire and to refrain from "the recruitment and use of mercenaries, enrolment of children, and violations of the accord on cessation of hostilities". They pledged to urge "their authorities to refrain from any bellicose acts such as abuses and violence [and] extra-judicial killings", according to a communiqué issued in

Lome. The two sides also "acknowledged the need to preserve territorial integrity, respect of institutions, and constitutional legality". Further progress was made on 1 November, when the government agreed to submit to parliament a draft amnesty law involving the liberation of jailed members of the military, an end to proceedings against people accused of jeopardizing state security, the return of soldiers from exile and their reintegration into the army, and other commitments.

Since then, however, the talks have foundered. The MPCI originally demanded a review of the constitution, the resignation of President Laurent Gbagbo and new elections. The government insisted that they disarm and that they deliver on their agreement to respect the country's territorial integrity and constitution. The MPCI later dropped its demand for Gbagbo's resignation, but replaced it in late November with a call for a new political dispensation, including a transitional government that would prepare fresh elections.

Highlight of the various peace agreements

Since the beginning of the conflict, the international community mainly represented by ECOWAS, AU, France and the UN have made attempts toward peaceful settlement of the crisis which resulted in various agreements, which most salient is the Linas-Marcoussis in which all parties to the conflict committed themselves to abiding to the resolutions.

From postponement to postponement the process has now to a standstill-1- the first deadline of DDR of its kind was supposed to take place on the 8 of March 2004.

DDR and its components

What is the DDR and how does it function?

To define what the DDR is we will be relying on the definition provided by the Kofi Annan, ex-Secretary General of the United Nations. According to him, 'Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatant. Demobilization refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin their transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatant; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military force. Reintegration refers to the process that allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training and job and income-generating projects' (The UN

Secretary General report, S/2000/101)³.

General trends of the DDR and its goals

The process generally involves six steps as follows:

1. Pre-disarmament assembly or cantonment
2. Selection for demobilization
3. Disarmament of demobilizing ex-combatants
4. Combatant status verification
5. Demobilization
6. Discharge

As noticed in the definition the word is an acronym composed of three entities: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. In the first place, the process is concerned with taking away from the fighters all arms and the likes, and lastly leads to an economic and social reintegration of the ex-fighters in order for them not to relapse into criminal activities or other wars. The ongoing debate about the programme is that some think should be considered as a whole, then all the steps should be implemented concomitantly concerning all the actors, whereas others recommend that much more emphasis should be placed on the direct actors involved in the conflict such as the combatants⁴. Either views had do not lack arguments, even if the process have been advocated and applied to many after war conflicts areas (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Namibia among others), it is also not free from criticism. Some authors such as Muggah et al. (2003) look suspiciously at it as an inefficient measure in the context of Republic of Congo. In fact, these consider it as a stopgap or a makeshift. Nevertheless, the World Bank views it as "key to effective transition from war to peace". Some others take it as a vital transition from war to peace (Hitchcock, 2004). In addition, according to Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), 38 civil conflicts have found positive settlements via the process of political negotiation since 1945 and 1998. Both views are certainly driven by the way the DDR is implemented in the field, that determines its success or failure.

Case studies

Successful DDR programmes

DDR programmes have been receiving attention over the last decade with the outbreak of social uprisings sweeping across the continent, so that the literature is

abundant. This part of the analysis, rather than being focused on a particular case of success, will deal roughly with the essential positive points running through all of them. Sierra Leone is cited as a successful case of DDR implementation as well as Mozambique. Looking through the way both programmes are implemented one can see that they share some common grounds that have made them successful. Among them the most salient are⁵:

Social reintegration of ex-combatants: Maybe the most important part of the DDR, reintegration of the former combatants remains critical to the whole process. The common idea is that all the social crisis arising in Africa have poverty as backdrop, poverty viewed as lacking in the basics for a decent such as education, employment and social perspective. Being aware of this fact, these programmes have been focusing their attention on the demobilized entities by providing them with education and employment in order not to incur the risk of their returning to war or engage in criminal activities. Special attention is devoted not only to the ex-fighters but also all the actors directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. Under these circumstances, women and their relatives, children used as child soldiers and disabled or ill-combatant received help and support in terms of training for some of them, and to a profession order to make a sustainable living on their own; because its final aim is to get them integrated in order not to relapse into another conflict or some criminal activities.

Although the reintegration of the ex-combatants is the final aim of the DDR, it needs financial support.

Financial support of the programme: The DDR is a long-term programme. As such, it needs financial support. It is now an evident fact that without a substantial financial support, the DDR process is doomed to fail. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the cost of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration are estimated as high as 150 million USD for the period 2005 to 2008, and the total related projects are numbered at 22,482,064.57 USD⁶. As seen the DDR is highly costly, and if the financial support happens to fail, it means that all the projects will be losing ground and collapse. Indeed, there are many partners supporting the process where it is applied. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, for example, all the multilateral and bilateral donors, including UNDP, UNICEF, France, EU, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Japan are involved.

Nevertheless, besides financial support, activity coordination among the various partners is also critical to the success of the process.

Coordination of activities or policy coherence: DDR is generally an outside driven process. That means that it is

³ Although the definition of DDR is from the UN Secretary General, its citation comes from the article of Stina TORJESEN in his article titled The political Economy of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Selective literature review and preliminary agenda for research (2006).

⁴ Critical literature about this debate is abundant.

⁵ Conversely most of the failures experienced by the DDR do not comply with these critical conditions.

⁶ <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php>.

Table 1. Success Factors Against Failure Factors of DDR.

	Factors of success	Factors of failure
Political will of all parties		
Active Participation of the Ex-fighters		
Involvement of local authorities (local capacity building and/ or ownership transfer)		
Seek of transitional justice		
Sufficient financial resources		
Involvement of outside actors		
Role of the medias		
Type of peace agreement		
Understanding cultural environment		

mainly supported in various ways by international donors. For that reason, it is interesting for all these agencies to coordinate their activities. According to Picciotto et al. cited by Bolton, "*Policy coherence has four interrelated dimensions. The first of them is about the internal consistency of the aid programme; the second is the whole of government coherence, the third is harmonization and finally alignment referring to the connection between donor policy and strategic practices in the country*"; because failing to coordinate initiatives will certainly result in a complete waste. Bolton explains the cases of DRC, the Congo, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone where the DDRs are being run (Bolton, 2004). Also important to the DDR is the establishment of transitional justice process.

Transitional justice

According to SRIRAM, transitional justice is the process of *looking for justice after gross abuses of human rights in a post war era* (Sriram, 2004). Transitional justice is not only about establishing a tribunal seeking for individuals guilty of war crimes or human rights violation. As Sriram insisted setting up a tribunal for justice seeking after gross human right abuses have been committed, may serve as example to potential human right violators, as well as institutional invigorators, and key to social reconciliation. Mentioning the case of Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra Leone) and Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), she pointed out that looking for justice after gross abuses of human rights in a post war era is a key asset to reaching peace, for one, because trials may serve as example to potential human right violators and as institutional invigorators, and second as social reconciliation instrument and a powerful way of detracting self-justice (Sriram, 2004). Table 1 highlights the main success factors for an endurable DDR scheme.

The Ivorian case and the implementation of DDR

In 2003, the Prime Minister Seydou DIARRA established

a National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (CNDDR), which prepared a "road map" for the implementation of the key provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, subscribed by all development partners.

DDR strategy and approach

Mandate and DDR provision in CPA: The current mandate was outlined in *Security Council Resolution 1609 of June 24, 2005*:

In the area of DDR, the mandate emphasizes support and assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation in carrying out the following DDR related activities in the realm of a "coordinated regional approach":

1. "Regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to assist in ensuring the security of their disarmament, cantonment and demobilization sites."
2. "Implementation of the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants" while taking into consideration specific needs of women and children. Additionally, implementation of the "Joint Operational Plan for the disarmament and dismantling of militias envisaged in article 4 of the Pretoria Agreement."
3. Coordination with the Sierra Leone and Liberia missions on the implementation of a "voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, paying special attention to the specific needs of women and children" while considering efforts and inputs of other governments, donors, international financial institutions and international development organizations.
4. "Secure, neutralize or destroy any weapons, ammunition or any other military material surrendered by the former combatants."

President Laurent Gbagbo remains head of state after the old mandate expires on October 17, 2005. Specifically, the African Union (AU) Plan calls for him to not stay in office any longer than 12 months.

Aim and objectives, eligibility and criteria / timeline of DDR processes

During the Yamoussoukro seminar that was held from 2nd to 6th May 2005, the ex-belligerent forces (FDS and FAFN) agreed that a total of 48,064 beneficiaries comprising 5,500 combatants from FDS and 42,564 ex-combatants from FAFN would benefit from the DDR programme. Women and/or girls associated with armed groups or forces and vulnerable groups (widow, disable and orphans) have also been included among these beneficiaries. According to the PNDDR programme, demobilized combatants will be entitled to a safety net package of 499,500 F CFA Francs for six months. This safety net package will be distributed to demobilized combatants upon presentation of their demobilization ID card at the regional office. The safety net package will be disbursed in the following sequence:

- i) 25% paid upon demobilization
- ii) 25% paid 45 days later
- iii) 50% remainder paid 90 days after demobilization

Ex-combatants will be oriented to the city or village district of origin or a locality where they will eventually choose to live. At the district office, ex-combatants will receive advice on available reintegration opportunities such as: education grant, vocational training, job placement, and income generating activities or micro-finance projects. An education grant of 200,000F CFA (maximum) will be allocated to ex-combatants that will opt to resume their studies. Tools kit will be given to ex-combatants that will chose vocational training at the end of the programme. Ex-combatants that will opt for micro-credit finance project will be entitled to a loan of 180,000 F CFA per individual plus a loan of 150,000 F CFA for the purchase of equipment. They will also be qualified for a loan of 100,000 F CFA for agricultural projects and for the purchase of seeds.

DDR zones

The ex belligerents have identified 11 DDR Zones across the territory of Côte D'Ivoire. In the northern part of the country (controlled by the Force Nouvelles) there are 5 DDR zones: Bouake, Bouna, Korhogo, Man and Seguela. In the southern part of the country (controlled by the FDS) there are six DDR zones: Abidjan, Guiglo, Daloa, Yamoussoukro, Bondoukou and San Pedro. ONUCI has already allocated some containers for all DDR sites to store and secure ammunitions and arms that will be collected during the disarmament process. Most of these zones have undergone extensive rehabilitation works. The Chiefs of Staff of the FDS and FAFN have agreed on a number and localities for the establishment pre-cantonment sites. There are 75 pre-cantonment sites in the FAFN controlled area, located in the northern part of the country, and there are 35 pre-cantonment sites located in the FDS

controlled are, located in the southern part of the country. Members of the armed forces from the belligerent parties are to be assembled in the pre cantonment sites prior to the commencement of the official DDR programme. These sites are technically operational and will be manned by the ex-belligerent forces as per a formal agreement between their respective chiefs of staff.

Once the DDR programme starts the participants are to move into 17 cantonment sites (nine in the FAFN controlled areas and eight in the FDS controlled areas). Here the weapons will be secured so as to allow the combatants to participate in the identification process (in which those deemed eligible will be issued with Côte d'Ivoire identity papers) and the voter registration process, which will take place concomitantly with the DDR programme. In order to allow the combatants to travel they would receive a first installment of the transitional safety net allowance once their weapons have been secured.

Upon completion of the identification process the combatant would return to the cantonment site for formal demobilization and to participate in reorientation programmes before returning to their respective region of origin where they would enter socio-economic reintegration programmes.

Approach to special groups (children, women, disabled and foreign combatants)

UNDP has secured funds to support the reintegration of women and girls in order to offer them the same economic opportunities as men and boys once they have departed from the cantonment site. ONUCI has also put in place an array of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Children associated with armed group or forces have a separate DDR programme. They will transit through an orientation and transit center under the management of UNICEF. Children are not entitled to the safety net package.

Operational structure and framework

Implementation mechanism

DDR units will assist in the implementation of a national DDR program, targeting combatants and paying special attention to women and children. Additionally, they will work in coordination with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants. The programme mandate calls for coordination between regional groups in the effort to secure, neutralize or destroy weapons and ammunition.

Institutional structure

The UN DDR units, under the auspices of UNOCI, are

assisted in the post conflict environment by ECOWAS, the African Union, and the State through the Government of National Reconciliation and the Election Commission.

Area of activity

Disarmament and demobilization

1. To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to assist in ensuring the security of their disarmament, cantonment and demobilization sites.
2. To support the Government of National Reconciliation in the implementation of the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, paying special attention to the specific needs of women and children.
3. To coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, paying special attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the Government of National Reconciliation and in cooperation with the Governments concerned, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations and donor nations.

Disarmament and dismantling of militias

1. To assist the Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation in formulating and monitoring the implementation of the Joint Operation Plan for the disarmament and dismantling of militias envisaged in article 4 of the Pretoria Agreement.
2. To secure, neutralize or destroy all weapons, ammunition and other military materiel surrendered.

Resource mobilisation

Budget, financial management framework, resource mobilization strategy

The cost of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for the period 2005 to 2008 is estimated at \$150 million. The Government of National Reconciliation is expected to provide about 30% of the funding and has thus far contributed 14,000,000 USD. The World Bank is considering the provision of an \$80 million grant and modalities and conditionality for the disbursement of the grant are currently in the process of being negotiated between the Ivorian Government and the World Bank. The approved multilateral and bilateral contributions to the DDR process, amount to 16,182,064.67 USD. The total for all the DDR related projects is 22,482,064.57 USD. The multilateral and bilateral donors are the following: UNDP, UNICEF,

France, EU, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Japan.

Current challenges and updates

is one of the main mechanisms that will be implemented to solve the Côte d'Ivoire conflict it is also closely linked to political progress in implementing the peace. The primary areas of focus will be to mainstream HIV/Aids programs in DDR, the formulation of mobile courts, and the establishment of identification centres, which will include an expansion in identification to all areas.

After negotiations at the October 2006 AU summit, the AU Peace and Security Council recommended that current President, Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny remain in office for no longer than 12 months. These recent developments, as in the past, do not make any of Côte d'Ivoire's current challenges any easier. A series of failed peace deals, an increase in human rights abuses, the postponement of elections that were to be held in October, 2006 and the Forces nouvelles continued refusal to give up arms until the existing nationality laws, which exclude individuals living in the north from gaining Ivorian citizenship, are reformed are just some of the major trials facing the country and, therefore, creating a series of political challenges for DDR related program work.

During a press conference at ONUCI, the Sanctions Committee President, Adamantios Vassilakis, outlined three major barriers within the peace process facing Côte d'Ivoire today, all of which are related to the challenge of disarming: (1) a credible process towards elections; (2) decision making on the issue of identity/nationality laws and (3) disarmament in an environment where the north and south interpret the process in the same manner. Without disarmament, there cannot be free and fair elections, or rather effective reintegration measures.

In October 2006, in order to expedite the disarmament process, and given the assurances given by the respective forces that the pre-cantonment of their troops had been completed by July 2006, it was proposed that the disarmament process should be relaunched and should start with the cantonment phase. In this regard, the verification, screening and profiling of combatants and the listing of their weapons would now be carried out during the cantonment phase of the programme. It was also decided to increase the number of cantonment sites to 17, including nine in the Forces nouvelles-controlled area and eight in the Government-controlled area. This may be delayed by a funding shortfall of \$10 million which the PNDDR needs to complete the physical rehabilitation of the facilities at the cantonment sites by the end of December. Furthermore, the World Bank continues to withhold the \$80 million it had pledged to contribute towards the total cost of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme (estimated at \$150 million, half of which would be provided by the

Government of Côte d'Ivoire and other donors) due to unpaid arrears.

In order to facilitate the timely resumption of the disarmament process, it is also imperative that PNDDR and UNOCI receive the lists of combatants and weapons from the Forces nouvelles and the FANCI before the resumption of the disarmament programme. Work on reintegration opportunities to be provided to ex-combatants should also begin without delay, so as to ensure that there would be no gap between disarmament and reintegration programmes.

Lessons learned

From the political viewpoint

One of the successes of the DDR is the political independence of its main organs. According to Hitchcock the main DDR organ should be confide to a civilian, mainly because a he has a neutral view on the process in comparison to those already involved in the conflict who may gear it to serve their political interests (Hitchcock, 2004). On the other hand, he recognizes that this has not always been the case, and the glaring examples include Afghanistan where the UN, the government and other agencies played a major role. It goes the same for Angola where the government played the role of facilitator.

From the social viewpoint

All DDR process should result in social peace, or as Bolton stated "DDR in the longer run...should lead to the sustained social and economic reintegration of former fighters into a peaceful and livelihood secure society". That is why he added "...effective DDR is always going to be problematic" (Bolton, 2004). For one DDR must be considered as a broader programme poverty reduction instead of just concentrating its attention on the actors in the conflict. On the other hand, nevertheless, being a long-term process that need monitoring and evaluation "Who will pay for this?" (Bolton, 2004).

Another critical point of the DDR is the reconciliation process. Some analysts strongly recommend the establishment of truth seeking process, not just for the form but as a social reconciliation instrument and a powerful way of detracting self-justice (Sriram, 2004).

CONCLUSION

As this short study showed, a successful DDR must comply with a few conditions, including providing job, education and health care for the demobilized combatants, especially for the handicapped, including psychological counseling. Consulting with all of them in

designing demobilization and reintegration program would also be necessary to its success. On the other hand, the programme should be political influence free, good monitored and well-financed till its end.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the main achievements of this short study about the prospective implementation of the DDR process in the conflict resolution in Cote d'Ivoire, the recommendations are:

1. The DDR should be considered as a whole social plan designed for all the parties involved in the conflict, because they should be able to lead an autonomous life both from social and economic point of view, for the aim of the programme is to attain peace,
2. All the intervening partners should coordinate their activities in an efficient way for a major achievement,
3. As conflict comes up swiftly, and peace is so hard to achieve once conflict has showed up, sufficient resources should be made available to sustain the process till its end.

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