

The impact of ideology upon Arab unity

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ABSTRACT

Arab unity is a term used differently by scholars, politicians and laymen alike. While it means, for President Nasser, the act of unification in federal or unitary states, it might be argued that it means also the adaptation of a unified position towards Arab and non-Arab issues. A unified Arab position exists when a cohesive view is exhibited regarding Arab and non-Arab issues. Accordingly, three key questions are raised by this study: Is Arab Unity still considered in the new millennium a salient case for Arab leaders and scholars? Does the issue of unified Arab foreign policy represent an aspect of Arab unity? And what are the most influential factors that affect the process of Arab unity in the new millennium? Although review of the literature reveals that several factors are identified by politicians and scholars as influential elements upon Arab unity, this study assumes that a continuing Arab ideological division is expected to affect negatively the Arab unity process in the new millennium. The results of this study, by and large, support the assumptions underlying the Arab World split into moderate-conservative and revolutionary sub-groups.

Keywords: Arab sub-groups, Arab unity, conservative, loading, moderate, revolutionary.

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INTRODUCTION

Arab unity has long been a controversial topic among politician, scholars and public opinion since the end of the World War two (1939 to 1945) and the creation of the United Nations "UN" in 1945.¹ In the early days of political independence, seven Arab countries encouraged practically by England to establish the League of Arab States "LAS" in March 22, 1945. The LAS was the first political confederation that coordinates the efforts of Arab states versus the external world, and its member states reached now twenty one countries plus the Palestine state. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral unity efforts succeeded some times, e. g., south and north Yemen and the United Arab Emeritus (UAE) in the 1970s, and failed some other times, e.g., the United Arab Republic "UAR" between Egypt and Syria in the 1960s.

Many factors were identified by scholars and politicians as handicapped; and delayed the process of Arab unity since the early days of political independence. While social-cultural elements were encouraging forces towards

Arab unity, e.g., common language and history; political-economic factors were delaying and handicapping forces towards achieving Arab Unity, e.g., ideological differences.

Ideologically, the Arab World split since political independence into three camps, namely: revolutionary, conservative and moderate countries. While the aim of the revolutionary Arab camp is to involve in a federation process; and thus changing the status quo in the region; the ultimate goal of the conservative-moderate countries is a loose confederation that emphasize sovereignty, independence and non-intervention in their internal affairs. Thus, the focus of this study is concerned with the impact of ideology upon the Arab unity in the new millennium.

METHODOLOGY

The term ideology was developed by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 and refers to "a systematic critical and therapeutic of the sensationalist grounds of ideas" (Miller, 1987:235). Later on, the term ideology was expanded to include all

1- The term Arab unity is used by this study to refer to an Arab unified position towards internal and external issues regardless the Arab countries are practically members in a federation or a confederation forms.

systems of idealistic, e.g., F. Hegel (1770 to 1831) and materialistic, e.g., K. Max (1818 to 1883) ideas. While the traditional concept of ideology is expanded to include socio-economic phenomenon, the most recent definition restricted it to political processes (Miller, 1987: 237). Nevertheless, this study is biased to the term ideology as a political process that could divide the Arab World into three main sub-groups.²

As far as the topic of the Arab ideologies is concerned, three views may be identified as follow: revolutionaries, moderators and conservatives. For example, while Arab radicals believe that Arab unity could be achieved by revolutionary means, their counterparts distrust such process.³ Nevertheless, the Arab moderators believe that Arab unity could be achieved evolutionary instead of revolutionary way. Consequently, three Arab views towards Arab unity, at least, can be identified as follow: revolutionary, moderate and conservative factions.⁴

Accordingly, several questions are raised by this study as follow: Is Arab Unity still considered in the new millennium a salient case for Arab leaders and scholars? Does the issue of unified Arab foreign policy represent an aspect of Arab unity? And what are the most influential factors that affect the process of Arab unity in the new millennium? Although review of the literature reveals that several factors are identified by politicians and scholars as influential element upon Arab unity, this study assumes that a continuing Arab ideological division is expected to affect negatively the process of Arab unity in the new millennium. Obviously, this study deals with the Arab unity as dependent variable and the Arab ideological division as independent variable. Figure 1 shows the expected causal relationship between the Arab unity on the one hand, and the Arab ideological division on the other hand. In this regard, review of the literature

2 - An ideological conflict is one aspect of politic; therefore, there are various levels of different ideologies. Nationalism, Fascism, Communism, Pluralism, Feminism, Islamism and Conservatism are different categories of political ideologies. Nevertheless, political ideologies are classified either as right versus left wings, or moderate-right versus moderate-left divisions. Review of the literature reveals that five levels of political ideologies are identified as follow: extreme right such as Fascism, extreme left such as communism, modernism such as pluralism, moderate-right such as capitalism, and moderate-left such as socialism. For more details see Lawson (1999).

3 -The terms revolutionary, radical and fundamental are used in this study interchangeably since changing the status quo dramatically are their objectives. For more details, see in this regard for example: Macridis (1980).

4 -While adopting a unified Arab position (or exhibiting unanimous voting pattern on the UN General Assembly's agenda) towards global issues represents a revolutionary stand that aim to change the status quo from divided views into a cohesive position towards Arab and non-Arab issues, the split view reflects a conservative orientations that emphasize sovereignty and independence for each Arab country. Furthermore, moderate view suggests an increase in the efforts of coordination and cooperation in order to reach a consensus on divergent issues that could threat the sovereignty of each Arab country. The relationship among the previous ideologies is interdependent; thus, when a revolutionary view dominates the Arab politics a coherent voting pattern (or a unified Arab position towards global agenda) is showed, and when a conservative view is widespread, the opposite occurred. Nevertheless, the existence of the three types of ideologies (independent variable) in the mean time (and this is the rule rather than the exception) leads to a lesser level of cohesion (dependent variable) towards global issues.

reveals that the ideological divisions are affected the UN members; therefore, UN voting clusters were classified accordingly. The Arab states are not expected to deviate from that impact, so further investigation will be conducted (Abulgasem, 1986).

As far as the data of this study is concerned, it should be emphasized that the United Nations' website is the main source of data.⁵ During the period of this study (2011 to 2014), the UN General Assembly adopted 1237 resolutions and decisions on the plenary and the committees' levels. In order to examine the validity of this study's assumption, these resolutions will be described and analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively. Examining the Arab countries split votes in four plenary and committees' sessions will enable us, by and large, to describe and analyze in scientific manner the impact of ideology upon the Arab unity in the early years of the second decade of the new millennium. Nevertheless, generalizations in this regard require more comprehensive studies, and that is a goal beyond the scope of this study.

Furthermore, since many decisions were adopted by the UN General Assembly either unanimously or without votes (n = 1237); therefore, the focus of this study is only on the split votes (n = 109) among the Arab countries. Methodologically speaking split votes means different views that reflect ideological and political differences; thus, the literature focused on them as an indicator to measure the level of consistency among certain voting blocs (Alker and Bruce, 1971). During the years, 2011 to 2014 there were 109 split Arab votes that reflected various Arab and non-Arab issues; thus, quantitative and qualitative description and analysis will be carried on in this regard.

According to the previous assumption, this study will be divided into three parts⁶ that deal respectively with: Arab Unity as a concept, Arab Ideological Division in the New Millennium, and finally the impact of Ideology upon Arab Unity.

Arab unity as a concept

Arab unity is a term used differently by scholars, politicians and laymen alike. While it means, for President Nasser, the act of unification in federal or unitary states, it might be argued that it means also the adaptation of a unified position towards Arab and non-Arab issues. A unified Arab position exists when a cohesive view is

5 - The main data source is available at Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides: <<http://www.research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/66>> [accessed 15 January 2015]

6 -For methodological reasons, there will brief sections on the dependent (Arab unity) and independent (Arab revolutionary, conservatives and moderate ideologies) variables. Describing and analyzing the dependent and independent variables will help us to explore later on (section three) the impact of ideological division upon Arab unity in the new millennium (Babbie, 2008:124-125).




Figure 1. The expected impact of the Arab ideological division upon the Arab unity.

exhibited regarding Arab and non-Arab issues.

Unity, as a general terminology, means “*the state of being one*” or “*unification*” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1978: 1401). Nevertheless, political unity refers to political processes in which individual countries have decided to work together towards a common cause. It does not necessarily mean that countries belong to the same union or political entity, but it means that they are willing to narrow down their differences and adopt a common view towards the external world in order to fulfill common interests and objectives.⁷

Scholars and politicians use the terms unity, solidarity and integration differently. While unity and solidarity are used as a term for togetherness or oneness, it is obvious that the integration term is dealt with as complicated processes. In this regard, Pentland indicated four types of integration processes (Pentland, 1973: 13-25):

1. Pluralistic community is one aspect of unity among homogenous democratic countries; therefore, a peaceful solution to conflicts among such states is the rule rather than the exception.⁸ Deutsch (1963) considers military

7 - See in this regard: “What is Political Unity?” Answers.com, available at this link: <http://www.answers.com/Q/What_is_political_unity> [accessed 20 September 2015]

8- According to the pluralist approach, integration means: “the formation of a community of states defined by a high and self-sustaining level of diplomatic, economic, social and cultural exchange between its members” (Pentland, 1973: 29).

alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or “NATO” among the Western countries as a good example for Security community arrangements.

2. Economic integration in terms of capital and labors free movement among certain group of countries, or what Mitrany (1933, 1966) called “*functionalism*”, is another type of unity that existed in Europe, when the Steel and Coal organization was established by six European countries in 1952, e.g., France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany.

3. Economic integration leads to political unification when political elites shift their loyalty and expectation towards new institutions that issue binding laws and decisions. Hass (1958, 1964) described the previous process as a “neofunctionalism”. Here the new political entity may reflect a unitary or federal form as far as the member states agree on such arrangements.

4. If economic forces lead to political unity as the neo functionalists argue, the federalists are biased to geopolitical factors as a way to achieve unity.⁹ Thus, a maximum unity can be achieved in this case by states when they join a federal union that issue binding laws and decisions upon its members, e.g, the United States of American and the Russian Federation.

9 Review of the literature reveals that elements such as political interest, geographical circumstances, multi social and cultural elements, are usually behind the establishment of federal states (Burgess, 1993; Elazar, 1987; Smith, 1995).

Obviously, the term integration is a new concept that developed by the European and American scholars. The integration movements in Europe since the early 1950s and 1960s resulted in a scholarly distinguished contributions that enriched the literature in this regard (Mitrany, 1933, 1966 and 1975; Hass, 1964). Nevertheless, the previous views towards achieving economic and political unity are reflected in the minds of Arab thinkers and politicians alike. Thus, scholars dealt generally with Arab unity topic either as a political unification led by elites (Haseeb, 2008), or as an informal process influenced by public opinion (Owen, 2012), or as an aspect of economic integration (Galal and Hoekman, 2003).

Practically, Arab leaders were either involved in regional or sub regional arrangements. The LAS is one of the oldest regional organization on the global level; therefore, it guarantees the lowest level of coordination and cooperation among its members since 1945 on the one hand, and emphasis the element of sovereignty and independence on the other hand. Criticism of the LAS as a cripple regional organization that failed to achieve the minimum level of Arab unity resulted in unilateral, bilateral and multilateral union arrangements among revolutionary and conservatives Arab countries alike, e.g., the union between Egypt and Syria, known as the United Arab Republic or "UAR", in 1958 to 1961. The failure of the LAS resulted from lack of compromises between individual and common interest on the one hand, and Egyptian domination of LAS on the other hand (MacDonald, 1965: 67). These continued failures led the secretariat and revolutionary Arab countries, e. g., Libya and Syria, to call for modification of its pact in order to meet internal and external challenges. Nevertheless, attempts to develop the LAS into an Arab Union were rejected by conservative-moderate Arab states.

The rise of Arab nationalism led some Arab leaders to involve in unification experiences that last for short period of time, e.g., the UAR. Furthermore, security and geopolitical elements were behind the establishment of enduring unification experiences, e.g., the United Arab Emirates "UAE" in December 2, 1971 and the Republic of Yemen in May 22, 1990.

By the end of the twentieth-century, functional and neofunctional elements were behind the establishment of new Arab sub regional arrangements, namely, the Arab Maghreb Union "AMU",¹⁰ and the Gulf Cooperation Council "GCC".¹¹ The founding fathers of Arab sub-regional arrangements influenced by the European successful experience of integration; thus, they expected a *spill over* process of economic and political integration

led by Arab political elites (Pentland, 1973).

Nevertheless, unilateral and multilateral efforts as well as regional and sub-regional arrangements did not necessarily lead to the establishment of an Arab union, but it increased certainly the levels of coordination and cooperation among the Arab states. Several factors handicapped the Arab states' efforts to increase their coordination and cooperation, and ideological differences is expected to be among the prominent factors that affect negatively the Arab position towards matters of common, partial and split interests in the new millennium.

Arab ideological division in the new millennium

On the contrary to the thesis of Fukuyama (1989), ideologies are a continuing process which distinguishes a group of countries from another on regional and global levels alike. Nevertheless, individuals, groups and countries may shift their ideological views when surrounding environmental conditions are changed; therefore, various communist revolutionary states shifted into capitalist and liberal ideologies when the communist regime failed in the Eastern Europe in 1990s. Furthermore, countries might shift from a conservative view into moderate or revolutionary orientations, due to internal and external environmental conditions.

As far as the Arab countries are concerned, previous studies indicated that the Arab World was divided ideologically into revolutionary, moderate, and conservative sub-groups during the second half of the last century. Alignment and realignment were also recorded; therefore, revolutionary Arab states became conservative and vice-versa, e.g., Egypt during presidents Nasser and Sadat eras (Abulgasem, 1985, 1989, 1992). These patterns of ideological division and alignment-realignment processes are expected to continue in the new millennium.

Consequently, the revolutionary Arab states are assumed to be more supportive of radical changes in the existing *status quo*. Furthermore, the revolutionary Arab states are expected to adopt an Arab common view on the one side, and participate and engage more actively in political unification movements than the conservative Arab countries on the other side. Moderate Arab states, presumably, are expected to reflect a middle position towards the subjects of adopting an Arab common view, changing the status quo in the Arab World, and supporting the Arab unification movements on bilateral and multilateral levels.

The division of the Arab World into revolutionary, moderate, and conservative's camps are expected to affect and extend into their position towards global agenda that represented during the ordinary annual meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nation. The positions of the Arab states towards the United Nations agenda are expected to continue to reflect ideological grounds during the new millennium.

10 For more details, see the AMU's website at this link: <<http://www.maghrebarabe.org/ar/uma.cfm>> [Accessed 25 September 2015]

11 For more information in this regard, you may visit the website of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf or the GCC at this link: <http://www.gcc-sg.org> [Accessed 25 September 2015].

In the new millennium, the moderate view is expected to be more dominant attitudes among the Arab states for several reasons: firstly, the failure of the Arab League to achieve higher levels of solidarity among its members led to *backlash* integration process on the regional level (Pentland, 1973).

Thus, the rise of sub-regionalism in the Arab World during the last decade of the twentieth century resulted in the establishment of new organizations that compete with the weak Arab League as a regional organization. The Union of the Arab Maghreb "UAM" and particularly the Gulf Countries Council "GCC" reflected a new model of successful coordination and cooperation on the sub-regional level; therefore, Arab nationalism and radicalism became less emphasized.

Secondly, the rise of political Islam in the new millennium deemphasized the issue of Arab nationalism on the one hand, and resulted in an increasing regional and global coordination and cooperation against terrorism on the other hand. The western view of globalization encouraged moderate-conservative Arab countries to be part of new alliances against extremism on political and religious levels, e.g., declaring war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria "ISIS" by moderate and conservative Arab states.¹²

Thirdly, the structure of the Arab World is another factor suggesting an increase in the moderate-conservative view among Arab countries. The alignment and realignment process within the Arab World is assumed to be more in favour of the moderate-conservative group during the new millennium compared with the post-independence era in the 1960s for example. The traditional moderate-conservative group, e.g., the six Arab Gulf countries along with other countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Djibouti and Mauritania are expected to share more common views on different matters; and thus, a larger moderate-conservative sub-group is assumed to exist in the new millennium.

In short, four comments should be mentioned regarding the expected Arab ideological division in the new millennium:

1. The ideological ground is expected to be a crucial factor contributing to the existence of various Arab sub-groups regarding the global agenda as developed by the UN General Assembly. Arab countries are expected to reflect generally three basic views which might be opposed to each other, namely moderate-conservative

versus revolutionary views.

2. The moderate-conservative and revolutionary views are expected to reflect different degrees of variation from one period of time to another. In this regard, while the revolutionary view was dominant in the second half of the twenty century, the moderate-conservative views are expected to be dominant in the new millennium due to internal and external environmental circumstances.

3. The alignment within the Arab sub-groups is not a consistent element over time. The moderate-conservative Arab states might become revolutionary countries and *vice versa*.

4. The division of the Arab World into various sub-groups are not expected to affect negatively their unity towards issues that reflect common interest; therefore, a united Arab position towards the Palestine case and matters of New International Economic Order "NIEO" are expected to be continued in the new millennium. The common interests that the moderate, the conservative and the revolutionary Arab states share are crucial elements decreasing the impact of the ideological differences upon the Arab unity *vis-a-vis* global agenda.

The impact of Ideology upon Arab unity

Here, the main focus is on the impact of ideology upon Arab cohesion in the new millennium; therefore, it was necessary to identify such terms in the first two sections of this study. The previous two sections identified the concept of Arab unity on the one hand, and the term Arab ideologies on the other hand. Accordingly, the emphasis of this section will be upon the impact of ideology upon Arab unity.

In order to describe and analyze the impact of ideology upon Arab unity in the new millennium, the Arab states were factor analyzed as variables, and the UN decisions (N = 109) were examined as observations.¹³ The focus in this sub-section will be on the Arab states positions towards different Arab and non-Arab matters; therefore, statistical investigations are conducted in this regard.

Consequently, data in Table 1 indicates generally different levels of consistency among the Arab states when Arab and non-Arab issues are concerned. Since the data of this study represent the years, 2011 to 2014; thus, we will examine also the influence of Arab Spring revolutions upon the solidarity of Arab states regarding various cases.

12 Political Islam as an ideology reflects generally three main orientations that reflect the thesis of this study namely: conservatives, moderate and revolutionary. While traditionalists "or conservatives" argues that contemporary political systems should be consistent with Islamic values, reformers "or revolutionaries" insist that Islam should have a Caliph, e.g., ISIS. Moderators indicate that Islam could be lived and accommodate to any type of government, e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood movements and parties. For more details see in this regard, (Hunt, 2013), available at this link: <[http://www.patheos.com/blogs/roberthunt/2010/10/is-islam-a-political-ideology/...](http://www.patheos.com/blogs/roberthunt/2010/10/is-islam-a-political-ideology/)> [accessed 5 May 2016].

13 Factor analysis was used widely by USA scholars since the inception of behaviourist school in the early 1960s. But, the establishment of the post-behavioural school in the early 1970s resulted in combined quantitative and qualitative methods in order to analyze and describe internal and external political processes, a goal is adopted by this study.(see in this regard: *Alker and Bruce, 1971*). Furthermore, Micro and macro analysis are conducted in order to examine the impact of ideology upon the positions of Arab states regarding various regional and global issues. The statistical outputs refers to the consistency of Arab individual countries as well as sub-regional and regional levels.(see in this regard for example: *Conway and Feigert, 1972*).

Table 1. Rotated component matrix (a) of Arab states on the macro-level.

| Country | Arab Gulf factor | Arab Maghreb factor | Syrian factor | Arab sub-Saharan factor |
|---------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Qatar | .831 | .257 | -.028 | .030 |
| Saudi Arabia | .811 | .120 | .078 | -.010 |
| Kuwait | .810 | .370 | .103 | -.093 |
| Bahrain | .803 | .402 | .153 | -.052 |
| Oman | .801 | .462 | -.010 | .075 |
| Sudan | .749 | .350 | -.041 | .048 |
| UAE | .727 | .378 | .313 | .067 |
| Egypt | .705 | .371 | -.140 | .185 |
| Jordan | .588 | .534 | .322 | -.025 |
| Yemen | .545 | .516 | .213 | .055 |
| Mauritania | .509 | .237 | .499 | .080 |
| Lebanon | .197 | .786 | -.130 | .030 |
| Tunisia | .306 | .768 | .165 | .065 |
| Algeria | .254 | .764 | .115 | -.021 |
| Libya | .279 | .627 | .108 | -.031 |
| Iraq | .419 | .583 | .280 | .125 |
| Djibouti | .481 | .577 | .473 | .096 |
| Syria | .255 | .018 | -.763 | .031 |
| Morocco | .413 | .386 | .588 | -.171 |
| Somalia | .202 | -.046 | .151 | -.787 |
| Comoros | .377 | .010 | .141 | .704 |
| % of Variance | 50.61 | 7.806 | 5.990 | 5.298 |

- Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Data Source: Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides. <http://www.research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/66>.

On the macro level of analysis, Table 1 shows the division of the Arab states into four sub-groups. Examining the data in Table 1 lead us to the following conclusions:¹⁴

1. There is no perfect Arab unified position towards regional and global agenda; therefore, the findings of this study support the conclusions of existing literature in this regards (Abulgasem, 1985). The Arab states still demonstrate split positions when non-Arab issues, e.g., human rights, and big powers conflicts, are involved. Sovereignty, national interest and ideological orientations are among the prominent crucial elements that determine the existence of a unified Arab or split positions towards sub-regional, regional and global matters in the new millennium.

2. The moderate-conservative view is, by and large, the most dominant orientation in the Arab World. Thus, factor one, or as we called the Arab Gulf states factor, explain by itself more than 50% of the total variance (%50.61) Furthermore, more than one half of the Arab countries (eleven states) are indeed highly loaded with the Arab Gulf states factor. For example, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Mauritania are highly or moderately loaded with the Arab Gulf states factor as a result of their unified positions on Arab and non-Arab issues.¹⁵ Since the Arab Gulf states factor includes monarchy, e.g., Gulf countries, Jordan, and the republic political systems, e.g., Egypt, Yemen, Mauritania and Sudan; thus, it might be concluded that the impact of political ideologies is more effective than the type of political systems (monarchies versus republics) that adopted by the Arab states.

3. Further examination of the Arab Gulf factor shows that the position of the member states of the GCC is more united than the position of the non-GCC member states. Consequently, the scores that exhibited by the Arab Gulf states with factor one is higher than their counter parts, For example, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Mauritania exhibited a lower scores compared with Qatar

¹⁵ Methodologically speaking, unanimous votes by the UN members in general and the Arab states in particular were excluded from the analysis; therefore, only split votes were factor analyzed in order to examine the consistency of Arab states positions towards Arab and non-Arab issues. For example, Arab split positions do exist even when Arab issues are involved; thus, the Arab states took different views regarding the violations of human rights in Syria. Here, one can emphasize that the national interest of individual Arab state prevails, and some other scholars argue in this regard that “the only way for Arab unity to be present in the future is for a common cause to be held by all Arab states that is neither contradictory nor dissimilar, and that they all feel is in their best interest to pursue.” for more details: (Heacocke, 2010), available at this link:

<https://www.academia.edu/3990253/Arab_Unity_Revisited_Nationalism_vs_us_Common_Cause> [Accessed 8 November 2015].

¹⁴ The data of Table: 1 and 2 indicate firstly, exploratory factor analysis that attempts to reduce the 109 UN resolutions into four underlying main factors; and secondly, confirmatory factor analysis that indicates more than four underlying factors for the 109 UN decisions, so we can examine the validity of ideological impact on the Arab unity.(See for more details: (Kim and Mueller, 1978: 5).

and Saudi Arabia (Table 1).

4. The Arab countries that adhere to moderate political Islam (Muslim brotherhood systems), such as Qatar and Sudan exhibited higher scores compared with the conservative Arab states that reject political Islam (secularism), e.g., UAE, Egypt and Jordan. Thus, there is different ideological views among the Arab countries that exhibited higher scores with factor one. Here, it is fair to conclude that the Arab common interests maximize the Arab unity on the one hand, and the different ideological views minimize the solidarity of the Arab states on the other hand.

5. The Arab four sub-groups are divided, by and large, on ideological basis. While Qatar is the most highly loaded country with the Arab Gulf factor, Lebanon, Tunisia and Algeria are the most highly states loaded with factor two that might be named the Arab Maghreb factor that explain only 7.81% of the total variance. Another Arab Spring country, e.g., Libya, is also highly loaded with the Arab Maghreb factor. While distinctive Syrian position towards Arab and non-Arab matters resulted in a negative voting position (-.763), continuous Somalian absence from the meetings of the UN General Assembly led also to negative loading with factor four (Table 1).

6. There are other factors that explain 30% of the total variance; therefore, we noticed that the four main Arab sub-groups explain 70% of the total variance. Some Arab states are considerably loaded with more than one factor, e.g., Jordan and Yemen are moderately loaded with the Arab Gulf states factor (.585 and .545) and the Arab Maghreb Factor, respectively (.534 and .516). Furthermore, Mauritania is also moderately loaded with the Arab Gulf factor (.509) and The Syrian Factor, respectively (.499) The highly and moderately loaded Arab countries with more than one factor as well as other non-mentioned factors that had not reported for methodological reasons are generally explain 30% of the total variance.

7. Although the Arab Gulf states led the moderate-conservative camp during the years 2011 to 2014 and they expected to do so in the near future, it is noticeable that the data of this study indicates also the existence of different views between the moderate and conservative parties. For example, the correlations between the UAE on the one hand, and Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the other hand are significant at the 0.01 level. Nevertheless, the correlation scores among UAE, Qatar (0.683), and Saudi Arabia (0.583) are lower than the correlation among the UAE, Oman (0.809) and Bahrain (0.775). Consequently, the UAE, Oman and Bahrain's positions are more identical with the behaviour of the Arab majority compared with the positions of the UAE on the one hand, and the views of Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the other hand.

7. Further macro analysis regarding the impact of ideology upon Arab unity will require different data from that mentioned in Table 1. The Arab sub-groups that will be examined are not only restricted in the GCC and

MAU, but it also includes the Arab Spring countries, e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, that witnessed considerable democratic transformation processes since 2011. In this regard, the data of this study showed that Syria position is very distinctive from the other Arab Spring countries; thus, the correlations among those countries were insignificant at the level of 0.05. Furthermore, the distinctiveness of Syrian position is insignificant at the level of 0.05 with the rest of Arab countries due to their supportive positions for the Syrian people revolution against dictatorship regime that killed, displaced and destroyed the country's infrastructures.

When we exclude certain Arab countries from the statistical analysis, a more Arab unified position is observed. Consequently, if we exclude Syria, Somalia, Comoros and Djibouti either for its isolation, e.g., Syria, or for their frequent absence from the UN General Assembly meeting, e.g., Somalia, Comoros and Djibouti, a higher level of Arab solidarity is recorded. In this case, factor one, or the Arab factor, explains 56.85% of the total variance. Figure 2 indicates the level of consistency among the Arab states from the Arab common position regarding controversial issues, e.g., human rights in Syria, and Cold War matters (e.g., Ukrainian crisis). The more consistent countries with the Arab common position, the higher level of loads exhibited by the Arab states; therefore, Oman (0.888) was for example more consistent with Arab common position in the years, 2011 to 2014 compared with Libya (0.606) and Lebanon (0.582).¹⁶

On the micro level of analysis, the data of Table 2 demonstrate that the impact of ideology upon the Arab unity, especially towards non-Arab issues, is different from one year to another. Thus, examining the data of Table 2 led us to the following conclusions:

1. Most of the Arab states are practically highly loaded with factor one (the conservative-moderate Arab states) during the years, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. While fifteen Arab states are highly loaded with the conservative-moderate Arab states factor in the year 2011, this number increased into nineteen Arab countries in the year 2012, and then declined into eighteen and sixteen in the years 2013 and 2014, respectively. Nevertheless, the importance of the conservative-moderate Arab states factors in the years 2011 to 2014 was observed by the total variances (around one half) that they were explained each year. Thus, it is obvious that most of the Arab states belong to the conservative-moderate Arab camp since the inception of the Arab

16 - If we restricted our statistical analysis to the GCC members, the first factor explains by itself more than three quarters (77.59%) of the total variance; thus, one could conclude that the Gulf countries is more united when they compared with the Arab countries as a whole. Here again we can say that Bahrain (0.916) and Oman (0.915) are more consistent with GCC's position towards controversial Arab issues compared with UAE (0.857) and Saudi Arabia (0.797).




Figure 2. The level of cohesion among Arab states in 2011 to 2014.

Table 2. Rotated component matrix(a) of Arab states on the micro-level.

| Arab States | Factor 1 2011 | Arab States | Factor 1 2012 | Arab States | Factor 1 2013 | Arab States | Factor 1 2014 |
|--------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| Bahrain | 0.919 | Yemen | 0.943 | UAE | 0.899 | Qatar | 0.971 |
| Jordan | 0.883 | Kuwait | 0.935 | Iraq | 0.894 | Egypt | 0.956 |
| Oman | 0.88 | Oman | 0.935 | Oman | 0.883 | Oman | 0.956 |
| Djibouti | 0.856 | Bahrain | 0.888 | Mauritania | 0.878 | Djibouti | 0.925 |
| UAE | 0.854 | Iraq | 0.857 | Jordan | 0.874 | UAE | 0.922 |
| Morocco | 0.842 | Qatar | 0.831 | Bahrain | 0.872 | Morocco | 0.922 |
| Egypt | 0.84 | Tunisia | 0.826 | Libya | 0.851 | Bahrain | 0.922 |
| Saudi Arabia | 0.816 | Djibouti | 0.806 | Qatar | 0.85 | Jordan | 0.922 |
| Kuwait | 0.800 | UAE | 0.804 | Kuwait | 0.85 | Kuwait | 0.906 |
| Sudan | 0.787 | Egypt | 0.787 | Yemen | 0.845 | Mauritania | 0.771 |
| Tunisia | 0.733 | Sudan | 0.783 | Algeria | 0.823 | Libya | 0.732 |
| Qatar | 0.71 | Comoros | 0.778 | Sudan | 0.815 | Iraq | 0.721 |
| Algeria | 0.585 | Mauritania | 0.778 | Djibouti | 0.793 | Yemen | 0.715 |
| Iraq | 0.556 | Libya | 0.756 | Lebanon | 0.769 | Algeria | 0.684 |
| Lebanon | 0.53 | S. Arabia | 0.72 | Tunisia | 0.766 | Sudan | 0.653 |
| Somalia | 0.046 | Jordan | 0.704 | S. Arabia | 0.688 | S. Arabia | 0.639 |
| Syria | 0.178 | Morocco | 0.656 | Egypt | 0.564 | Somalia | -0.167 |
| Yemen | 0.579 | Algeria | 0.585 | Syria | -0.009 | Tunisia | 0.352 |
| Libya | 0.248 | Lebanon | 0.541 | Comoros | 0.093 | Comoros | 0.481 |
| Comoros | 0.344 | Syria | -0.264 | Somalia | 0.038 | Lebanon | 0.262 |
| Mauritania | 0.331 | Somalia | 0.271 | Morocco | 0.423 | Syria | 0.277 |
| % Variance | 57.47% | | 46.83% | | 55.69% | | 56.38% |

Spring revolutions in 2011.

2. The dominance of the conservative-moderate Arab camp did not mean the absence of other ideological Arab camp, namely the revolutionary group. Consequently, some other Arab countries, e.g., Syria and Somalia, represent other ideological views; therefore, the data of this study indicate the existence of other factors. While six Arab states were weakly loaded with factor one in 2011 on the one hand, they are also highly loaded with other factors on the other hand. For example, Somalia is negatively-moderately loaded with factor two (-0.666) that explain 10.19% of the total variance, and Syria is also positively-moderately loaded with factor three (0.765) that explain only 9.48% of the total variance.

3. A fourth Arab sub-group was also existed in the year 2011, and it represents mainly Arab Spring countries, e.g., Yemen and Libya. Nevertheless, the loading of Yemen and Libya with the Arab Spring factor, or factor four, is quietly moderate; thus, it explains only 7.9% of the total variance. The polarization of a new Arab sub-group (the Arab Spring factor) that mentioned by the data of this study reflect a new era of Arab politics and ideologies. Arab Spring countries witnessed in the years 2011 to 2012 democratic transformation processes; therefore, democratic governments were elected freely in Tunisia,¹⁷ Egypt and Libya. Although, these elected government represented generally moderate political Islam views (Muslim Brotherhood parties rules); Islamism versus secularism orientations re-existed noticeably in the Arab World politics during the years, 2011 to 2014.

4. The result of the Tunisian democratic election on the one hand, and the political change in Egypt in 2014 on the other hand,¹⁸ led to the defeat of Muslim brotherhood movements in both countries. Additionally, the new elected parliament in Libya resulted also in anti political Islamic attitudes; therefore, two governments exercised their powers in the eastern and western parts of Libya since August 4, 2014. Furthermore, civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen resulted in a new Arab re-alignment biased into the moderate-conservative camp. Thus, Egypt (0.956), Libya (0.732) and Yemen (0.715) were highly and moderately loaded with factor one that represent the moderate-conservative coalition.

5. Moderate political Islam regimes rejected extremism,

17 Tunisia, as a leading Arab Spring countries, was also highly loaded (0.786) with factor two (the Tunisian-Somali factor) in 2014. The Tunisian-Somali factor explained 16.16% of the total variance; thus, other Arab states were either highly loaded with it, e.g., Somalia (0.805), or moderately loaded with it, e.g., Comoros (0.642), Lebanon (0.622) and Syria (0.593). While the frequent absence of Somalia and Comoros resulted in their distinctive positions, obviously Syria and Lebanon adopted a divergent approach towards Arab and non-Arab matters.

18 The overthrow of the elected Islamist president (Mohamed Morsi) in Egypt by the Egyptian army is obviously a *coup d'état* rather than a revolution, and for more details on the subject see for example: Ahmed Safwat, "Egypt's Bloody Coup d'état," Open Democracy (3 October, 2013) available at this link: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/ahmed-safwat/egypt%E2%80%99s-bloody-coup-d%E2%80%99etat> [Accessed 10 September, 2016].

such as al-Qaida and the "ISIS"; therefore, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sudan were highly or moderately loaded with the Arab factors "factors ones" during the years, 2011 to 2014. Tables 1 and 2 showed that Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sudan were highly loaded with factors that represent the moderate-conservative views. Extremism is among other internal and external reasons that resulted in the domination of the Arab moderate-conservative view in the new millennium.

6. The Arab leadership and the level of consistency with the Arab common position towards controversial issues that was examined by this study changed from one year to another. Oman for example was one of the leading Arab countries that exhibited high loading scores with the first factors during the years, 2011 to 2014. Furthermore, Oman was the third highly loaded country with the first factors in the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively. Nevertheless, the most consisted countries with the Arab common view was varied from one year to another; thus, while Bahrain (0.919) and Yemen (0.943) were highly loaded with factor ones "Arab factors" in the years 2011 and 2012; UAE (0.899) and Qatar (0.971) were more consistent with the Arab common position towards the controversial issues in 2013 and 2014, respectively.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While unity is the ultimate goal for the Arab nationalists, it is not the same case for the Arab conservative sub-group. Nevertheless, the goal of Arab moderates is to achieve unity through evolutionary rather than revolutionary ways. The revolutionary processes to achieve unity dominated the Arab politics during the last century; thus, several successful and failed unification movements were recorded. While Yemen and UAE represent the first case, the UAR in the 1960s indicated the second example or the failed experience. The LAS was established in 1945 in order to coordinate the efforts of its members regarding Arab and non-Arab issues. This study examined the level of coordination and cooperation among the Arab states in the second decade of the new millennium, and find out that the unity of Arab states towards global agenda is affected by their ideological orientations on the one hand, and the moderate-conservative view is dominated the Arab politics in the new millennium on the other hand.

Furthermore, this study examined three main questions: Is Arab Unity still considered in the new millennium a salient case for Arab leaders and scholars? Does the issue of unified Arab foreign policy represent an aspect of Arab unity? And what are the most influential factors that affect the process of Arab unity in the new millennium?

Regarding the findings of this study, it should be emphasized that Arab unity as a term is not limited to the

process of establishing a federal or unified political entity, but it also represents a unified or semi-unified position towards Arab issues in general and non-Arab matters in particular.¹⁹ The Arab countries sub-group positions towards global agenda were affected mainly by its internal structure in the new millennium. By and large, the Arab countries were divided ideologically into three main factions or sub-groups, namely: the conservative, the moderate and the revolutionary sub-groups. Thus, the Arab states solidarity in the new millennium is affected generally by their ideological views. Several other factors are mentioned, but they require further investigation.

Furthermore, ideological division among the Arab states disappears generally when the common interest issues are concerned, e.g., the Palestine case.²⁰ Ideological division among the Arab states appears when the divergent interest issues are concerned, e.g., human rights and Cold War matters such as the crisis in Ukraine in 2015. Here, different split positions were recorded on the basis of different ideological views and divergent national interests. While the moderate conservative view dominates the Arab politics in the new millennium, the revolutionary orientation was more prominent during the second half of the last century.²¹ Although the revolutionary view does not dominate the Arab politics in the new millennium, it still continues to exist. Syria and Somalia are examples of revolutionary countries that engaged in wars as an objective.

The Arab sub-groups were divided and will continue to be divided according to their ideological views as well as their national interests. Nevertheless, further empirical studies in this regard should be conducted in order to examine relevant hypotheses. Although the inception of the Spring Revolutions were expected to affect negatively the Arab solidarity in the second decade of the new millennium, the data of this study demonstrated generally that the positions of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were more consistent with the moderate-conservative rather than the revolutionary views. Nevertheless, Syria exhibited distinctive position from the majority of Arab states when non-Arab matters are involved.

The Arab sub-groups in the new millennium reflected alignment-realignment processes; thus, leadership roles were changed from one year to another. While Bahrain

and Yemen were the highly loaded countries with factor ones "the Arab factors" in the years 2011 and 2012, UAE and Qatar were the most highly loaded states with the Arab factors in the years 2013 and 2014, respectively. In short, the Arab common interests maximize the Arab unity on the one hand; and the different ideological views minimize the solidarity of the Arab states on the other hand.

The results of this study, by and large, supported the assumptions underlying the Arab World split into moderate-conservative and revolutionary sub-groups. The alignments and realignments processes might shift again from moderate-conservative into the domination of revolutionary views; therefore, further research in this regard is also required.

Previous findings will help us answer the three main questions of this study that were mentioned in the methodology. Regarding the first question, it might be concluded that the Arab Unity issue is still considered in the new millennium a salient case for Arab leaders and scholars alike. The goal of the Arab League and its mission in the United Nations in New York focuses on a minimum coordination and cooperation process among the Arab countries in order to achieve a higher level of cohesion. But, the findings of this study referred in the mean time to the existence of various Arab sub-groups that could be classified on ideological grounds, namely, moderate, conservative and revolutionary clusters. Furthermore, the Arab unity, for example, is the main goal of non-governmental organization, e.g., the Centre for Arab Unity Studies; thus, many scientific conferences were held and scientific studies were published.

Additionally, this study identified two ways of achieving the Arab unity; therefore, engaging in real unification process or adopting coherent positions towards Arab and non-Arab issues represent two aspects of Arab unity. The findings of this study demonstrated that the voting patterns of the Arab states in the UN General Assembly reflect simultaneously their unity and disunity aspects regarding the Arab and non-Arab matters.

Finally, several factors are identified as the most influential factors that affect the process of Arab unity in the new millennium. National interests, Arab nationalism, sovereignty and political independence, globalization and ideologies are among the most influential factors that affect the process of Arab unity in the new millennium. Nevertheless, the focus of this study was on the impact of ideology upon Arab unity; thus, further research is required regarding the impact of other elements upon Arab unity.

As far as the recommendations of this study are involved, several points might be mentioned as follows:

1. Enhance the coordination process "joint meetings" among the Arab missions' representatives in the United Nations and other missions on the level of regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the African Unions,

19 - When a unified Arab position or a consistent Arab voting behaviour on global agenda does exist, an Arab federation term will reflect reality rather than idealist concept. A unified Arab foreign policy will demand political institutions that issue binding decisions upon its members, e.g., federal or unitary institutions.

20 - Usually, the Arab states adopt unified positions towards Arab matters; thus, a coherent position regarding Arab matters was recorded in the new millennium. Other studies reached the same conclusion regarding the Arab solidarity towards the Palestine case since the second half of the twentieth century. (Abulgasem, 1985)

21 - As the case was with the revolutionary sub-group in the last century, the moderate conservative factors explained more than one half of the total variance in the new millennium; therefore, the alignment-realignment processes resulted in the domination of moderate conservative views since the beginning of the new century.

the Organization of Islamic States, Group of 77, the MAU and GCC.

2. Encourage and support scientific oriented research institutions that focus on the processes of Arab unification regionally and globally alike, e.g., the Centre for Arab Unity Studies.

3. Establish an Arab Union, or develop the pact of the Arab League in order to cope with the serious challenges that face the Arab people in the new millennium; thus, an Arab Union with binding decision powers might be able to change the negative aspects into positive ones and the challenges into opportunities.²²

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²² Forecasting the process of Arab unity requires the diagnosis of the current circumstances of the Arab World. SWOT analysis is a useful tool to begin with; therefore, the focus should be on the internal and external environments. While the strength and weakness points reflected the dimension of internal environment, it is obvious that the opportunity and threats elements represented the external environment. According to the SWOT analysis technique, the Arab World reflects strength and weakness aspects on the internal level, and challenges and opportunities on the global environment. While the common Arab heritages are considered a point of strength, the Arab League as dysfunctional intergovernmental regional organization might be considered as an indication of weakness. Furthermore, globalization represent an opportunity for the Arab World in order to increase their coordination and cooperation with other regional groups and face the challenge of their ineffectiveness on the global politics level. For further information on the topic of "SWOT analysis" (Blue, 2014).